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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical accident involving an intoxicated driver. A
father places his daughter into her car seat and makes sure she is safely
buckled in before he settles into the driver’s seat. He stops at a red light and
turns to watch his daughter playing in the backseat. After the traffic light
turns green and he continues to drive home, a car weaves through the median
and slams into the driver’s door. Within moments, the father succumbs to his
injuries, and his toddler, now in critical condition, is rushed to the hospital.
The police officers’ investigation reveals the driver of the second car had a
blood alcohol content far surpassing the legal limit. This hardly comes as a
surprise to the officers; every fifty-one minutes that tick by, another person
will die in an accident involving an intoxicated driver.2
Complicating this situation even further is the fact that fifteen minutes
1
The author is a 2015 graduate of the University of Dayton School of Law, Editor-in-Chief of the
Law Review in 2014–2015, and the recipient of the Michael and Elissa Cohen Award for Best Written
Student Comment. The author offers her sincere appreciation to Professor Adam Todd for his guidance
and advice, and to the Staff Writers and Editorial Board for their countless hours spent on the editing
process. Lastly, the author would like to thank her husband for his endless support and encouragement.
2
Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN. (Dec. 2013), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf.
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earlier the intoxicated driver had been in a hospital emergency department
(“E.D.”). While some may blame the emergency physician for not preventing
the intoxicated man from leaving, consider the hypothetical plight of the
physician.3 A child with a blocked airway could not be revived, a seemingly
healthy forty-year-old woman died of cardiac arrest, and an elderly man
slipped into a vegetative state. With no time to dwell on the losses, the
physician immediately goes to the next trauma room. A young man in his
mid-twenties, with what appears to be a minor injury, is sprawled across the
bed, shouting vulgarities and being aggressive toward staff.4 The toxicology
screen confirms that the patient’s blood alcohol content is over the legal limit.
The physician informs the young man that someone will be in shortly to
further evaluate him. Shortly thereafter, a nurse informs the physician that
the young man has eloped from the E.D.
The physician, in the throes of a life-saving medical procedure with
another patient, is stumped. Should she call the police? After all, the patient
was considered intoxicated only fifteen minutes prior. If she calls the police,
would she be violating the patient’s privacy rights by disclosing personal
information? There is not enough time to call the hospital’s legal department,
and the physician must focus on the critical situation currently in front of her.
Unbeknownst to the physician and hospital staff, the patient who fled the E.D.
quickly got into his car and drove haphazardly until ultimately striking the
vehicle containing the child and her father.
As this vignette illustrates, emergency physicians who treat and
interact with intoxicated patients must walk the line between confidentiality
and protecting a third party.5 “Traditionally, the physician–patient bond is
considered as sacrosanct as that between parishioner and priest. . . . [But], this
bond is muddied somewhat when potential for harm to other innocents rests
on it.”6 Emergency physicians are charged with treating patients expediently
and effectively––but as the E.D. is increasingly used as a de facto holding
tank for intoxicated individuals, these physicians must also battle to treat all
patients in the E.D. without sacrificing public safety.7
On December 28, 2000, this conflict between patient privacy and
public safety became vastly more confusing: the Health Insurance Portability
3
Peter Tyson, One Night in an E.R., NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/o
ne-night-emergency-room.html (“[Dr.] Finkel tells me how busy it normally is. On a recent night[] . . . she
charted a patient on average every 11 minutes.”).
4
Rob Orman, Art of the Chemical Takedown, ERCAST.ORG (June 27, 2014), http://blog.ercast.org/art
-chemical-takedown/ (“An unruly, intoxicated and violent patient rolls into the ED. The situation and the
patient are both in need of control.”).
5
Chris Cotton et al., Ethics Roundtable Debate: Is a Physician-Patient Confidentiality Relationship
Subservient to a Greater Good?, 9 CRITICAL CARE 233, 233 (2005), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti
cles/PMC1175898/.
6
Id.
7
David W. Ross et al., EMS Triage and Transport of Intoxicated Individuals to a Detoxification
Facility Instead of an Emergency Department, 61 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 175, 181 (2013).
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and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) was expanded to establish the Privacy
Rule, effectively increasing emergency physicians’ level of trepidation.8 As
one physician muses, “It is easy to become caught up in obstacles and hurdles
that HIPAA can impose on physicians trying to care for patients. Sometimes
we long for a no-holds-barred environment unencumbered by rules.”9 Though
its intent is to safeguard patients’ personal information, the Privacy Rule also
compels physicians to identify what information must be kept in the
proverbial vault of secrecy and what must be shared for protection purposes.10
Many providers struggle with this situation.11 This Comment argues that the
HIPAA Privacy Rule must be amended to make a physician’s duty to warn of
intoxicated patients mandatory in order to provide guidance to physicians, as
well as to protect innocent third parties.
First, this Comment will discuss the nuances of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule and explain to what extent physicians are able to disclose Protected
Health Information (“PHI”). This discussion will examine the current
protections of the Privacy Rule and the repercussions for physicians who
violate HIPAA.
Second, it will analyze how the situations surrounding intoxicated
patients leaving the hospital apply to the Privacy Rule. This examination will
elaborate on the need for mandatory disclosure to authorities related to
intoxication and will compare this need with physicians’ mandatory duty to
disclose information related to the mentally ill.
Lastly, this Comment will propose an amendment to the Privacy Rule
to remedy the quandary many physicians feel. This section will define the
provision’s scope and will examine how the current Privacy Rule is an
inadequate resource for emergency physicians.
II. BACKGROUND
It is well established that drug and alcohol intoxication is a large
problem in the United States.12 Though much of our society recognizes the
8
The Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa
/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2015); see also Daniel J. Solove, HIPAA
Turns 10: Analyzing the Past, Present and Future Impact, AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N (2013),
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_050149.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_0
50149.
9
Vijay Aswani, Doctors, Writing, and HIPAA, 40 FAM. MED. 623, 624 (2008) (discussing how
HIPAA places limits on physicians’ non-medical tasks).
10
Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir. of the Office for Civil Rights, to the Nation’s Health Care
Providers (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf.
11
Carolyn Buppert, Legal Obligations to the Dangerous Patient, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 18, 2009), http://w
ww.medscape.com/viewarticle/707580 (discussing the repercussions to health care providers for notifying
law enforcement about intoxicated drivers leaving the E.D.); Aswani, supra note 9.
12
See generally Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Alcohol Poisoning Kills
Six People in the US Each Day (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0106-alcoholpoisoning.html; Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html.
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clear impact on the intoxicated individual and his potential future victim,
many people overlook the impact on emergency departments and health care
providers. The following sections of the Background explain how
intoxication affects the emergency departments of American hospitals, how
the HIPAA Privacy Rule changes the way physicians must handle situations
in the E.D., and what the consequences are for physicians who are in violation
of HIPAA.
A. Drug and Alcohol Abuse Affecting the E.D.
The alcohol and drug problems plaguing the United States have a
correlative effect on the number of intoxicated patients seen by physicians in
emergency departments.13 The country’s drug problem has been on the rise,
with E.D. visits for drug related issues increasing by 81% from 2004 to
2009.14 In 2009, the most recent reporting year for drug-related hospital E.D.
visits, approximately 2.1 million people visited the E.D. for visits related to
drug abuse.15 These visits were comprised of situations related to alcohol,
illicit drugs, and non-medical use of prescription drugs.16 Many intoxicated
individuals arrive at the E.D. for treatment solely based on their state of
inebriation, and not for urgent medical problems.17 In some circumstances,
paramedics transport individuals to the E.D. after giving the individual the
choice of going to the hospital to sober up or being taken to jail.18 The climate
of the E.D. has had to change in order to meet the societal needs resulting
from the over-population of intoxicated individuals in the E.D.19
The financial repercussions of intoxicated driving are significant.20
Studies show that the costs are nearly four times greater for emergency
providers to treat drunk drivers than they are for the same providers to treat
sober drivers.21 And while emergency departments resoundingly experience
the financial impact, the time and labor associated with intoxicated patients
must not be overlooked.22 Because impaired patients are less likely to
accurately describe any symptoms or pertinent medical history, physicians
feel compelled to perform more in-depth examinations and order more tests
13
DrugFacts: Drug-Related Hospital Emergency Room Visits, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://w
ww.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/drug-related-hospital-emergency-room-visits (last updated May
2011).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Robert Donovan, Jail or ER: An Easy Choice for Drunks, EMS1 (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.ems1.c
om/communications-dispatch/articles/805135-Jail-or-ER-An-easy-choice-for-drunks/.
18
Id.
19
Matt Dunning, Drunk Patient Lawsuit Highlights Hospital Risk Management Issues, BUS. INS.
(Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130825/NEWS06/308259976.
20
Tiffany O’Callaghan, The ER Costs of Treating Drunk Drivers, TIME (Oct. 8, 2009), http://healthlan
d.time.com/2009/10/08/the-er-costs-of-treating-drunk-drivers/.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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than might have been needed had the patient been sober upon arrival.23
With the large amount of intoxicated patients in the E.D., health care
providers must grapple with patient safety issues and the safety of third
parties.24 This situation is quite troubling for many health care providers,
including a group of physicians who state that there are many patients in their
E.D. who are observed and treated for intoxication when this could occur at a
specialized facility for the inebriated.25 Due to the amount of intoxicated
patients flooding emergency departments across the nation, it is now
considered an average day for emergency physicians to have multiple
intoxicated patients sobering up under their watch.26
One such average day occurred at St. Francis Hospital in New York–
–a patient presented to the E.D. with acute intoxication and left the department
shortly thereafter while still intoxicated.27 The emergency physician had
granted approval for the patient, Kevin Kowalski, to be admitted to the
hospital’s detoxification center, but before being admitted Kowalski removed
his IV and informed the nurse he would be calling a taxi to take him home.28
When the nurse went out of the room to tell the emergency physician about
Kowalski’s intent to leave, Kowalski left the E.D.29 The physician declined
to contact the police but did inform security personnel within the hospital that
the patient was intoxicated.30 A short time after leaving the E.D. on his own,
a car struck Kowalski as he walked alongside a road.31
In his lawsuit against the physician and the hospital, Kowalski argued
that the physician should not have allowed him to leave the E.D. but the court
disagreed with the patient.32 In affirming a judgment for the physician and
hospital, the court held that “the [New York] common law permitted the
restraint of people whose mental state might make them a danger to
themselves or others only in extreme circumstances.”33 One might ask what
classifies as extreme circumstances, which is why the Kowalski case
illustrates the unsettling situations facing emergency physicians related to
intoxication and disclosure.34
Based on the amount of intoxicated patients visiting the E.D., most
23

Id.
Cotton et al., supra note 5.
25
Ross et al., supra note 7, at 183.
26
Prepared to Care: The 24/7 Standby Role of America’s Hospitals, AM. HOSP. ASS’N 1, 4 (Nov.
2012), www.aha.org/content/12/preparedtocare.pdf (discussing that an average day for an emergency
physician can consist of allowing intoxicated patients to sleep in the E.D. until sober).
27
Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 995 N.E.2d 148, 149 (N.Y. 2013).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 150.
33
Id. (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 149.
24
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hospitals have had to create or alter policies to protect themselves, the patient,
and third parties.35 These policies often deal with the regulating of blood
alcohol content screening, the permissibility of chemical and physical
restraints, and how to prevent premature release of still-intoxicated patients.36
At a minimum, the screening policies should include: “how to facilitate an
involuntary commitment, when to call law enforcement officials, what
reporting laws might apply to the situation (if any), and how to comply with
a Tarasoff obligation.”37 Without implementing successful policies,
especially in the face of confusion felt by many emergency physicians, the
E.D. is more likely to face liability after any incident involving an intoxicated
patient.38
While a number of intoxicated patients leave the E.D. without making
hospital staff aware, others choose to formally discharge themselves against
medical advice.39 Proper documentation for leaving against medical advice
is likely to protect hospitals and physicians alike, provided they are executed
properly and under the appropriate circumstances.40 The documentation ends
the relationship between physicians and patients, allows providers the defense
that the patient assumed the risk of signing out against the advice of his doctor,
and shows a record of the patient’s refusal to be treated.41
Out of practicality for physicians and patients alike, “it is crucial that
patient safety and the safety of third parties, as well as any legal requirements,
are considered prior to release.”42 Patients who decide to sign out of the
hospital against medical advice do so to exercise their own right to refuse
care, yet physicians must be sure the patient has the requisite capacity to make
such a decision.43 If a physician does not believe the patient has adequate
mental capacity to sign out against medical advice, holding the patient
involuntarily in the E.D. may be the only viable option.44 Physicians are
35
Yesha Patel & Gus M. Garmel, Management of Intoxicated/Violent Patients, in EMERGENCY
MEDICINE: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS AND IMPROVING THE OUTCOMES 99, 99 (Amal Mattu & Deepi Goyal
eds., 2007).
36
Id. at 101–06.
37
“Difficult” Patients in the Emergency Department: Guidelines to Reduce your Liability Exposure,
EMEDICINE ALERT (Medical Insurance Exchange of California, Oakland, C.A.), May 2010, at 2.; see
generally Douglas Mossman, Article Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 523 (2006) (The Tarasoff obligation, stemming from Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, places a requirement on mental health providers to both recognize and report a serious threat
of violence when one is stated by a patient.); see infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
38
EMEDICINE ALERT, supra note 37, at 2.
39
Patel & Garmel, supra note 35, at 105.
40
Darren P. Mareiniss, Protecting EDs & Providers When Patients Leave Against Medical Advice,
PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (July 2, 2013), http://www.physiciansweekly.com/emergency-department-properdischarge/.
41
Id.
42
Patel & Garmel, supra note 35, at 105.
43
Frederick Levy et al., The Importance of a Proper Against-Medical-Advice (AMA) Discharge: How
Signing Out AMA May Create Significant Liability Protection for Providers, 43 J. EMERGENCY MED. 516,
517–18 (2012).
44
Id.
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advised to observe the patient to determine if the level of intoxication
interferes with the requisite capacity for a proper discharge against medical
advice.45 Furthermore, a patient “may compromise [the legal right to leave
the E.D.] if he or she intends to get into an automobile, or in some other
fashion may become a danger to himself or others.”46 Because intoxicated
individuals have a large impact on emergency departments, physicians are in
an unfortunate position to balance the rights of these intoxicated patients with
the safety and liability of others.
B. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule
Since its implementation in December 2000, HIPAA’s Privacy Rule
has created consternation for many physicians about the ability to disclose
personal information.47 The Privacy Rule adds another layer of concern for
E.D. physicians. Though physicians are undoubtedly concerned about the
repercussions of violation, the Privacy Rule was enacted as a way to
champion the protection of patients’ medical records.48 The Rule focuses on
a patient’s PHI, which is generally interpreted as information found in a
patient’s medical record that can identify the patient.49 The scope of PHI is
quite extensive––any information that could be used to identify a patient, such
as his name, date of hospital admission and discharge, or current medical
condition is considered PHI.50 Additionally, the Privacy Rule is only focused
on disclosures made by covered entities, which are defined as health care
providers conducting electronic transactions, health care plans, and
clearinghouses of health care information.51
The Privacy Rule permits disclosure of PHI without requiring
authorization from the patient if the circumstance fits into one of the provided
categories.52 Disclosure is permissible when the law requires it, such as for a
45

Mareiniss, supra note 40.
Dan Sullivan, Alcohol Impaired Patient: Risk Management Recommendations, THE SULLIVAN
GROUP, https://www.thesullivangroup.com/risk_resources/alcohol_impaired_patient/alcohol_9_risk_man
agement.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
47
What Physicians Need to Know About the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 5 O’CLOCK RECORDS (July 24,
2013), http://blog.5oclockrecords.com/post/65066347262/what-physicians-need-to-know-about-the-hipaa
-privacy.
48
What Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Do?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hh
s.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/privacy_rule_general_topics/187.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2006).
49
Guidance Regarding Methods of De-Identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-iden
tification/guidance.html#protected (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
50
Alice G. Gosfield, The HIPAA Privacy Rule: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, 9 FAM. PRAC.
MGMT. 35, 36 (2002), www.aafp.org/fpm/2002/1100/p35.html (discussing what information is generally
classified as PHI).
51
Are You a Covered Entity?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Regul
ations-and-Guidance/HIPAA-AdministrativeSimplification/HIPAAGenInfo/AreYouaCoveredEntity.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2013, 10:13 AM)
52
45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2013) (stating the permissible uses and disclosures of PHI that a covered entity
can make without the patient’s authorization).
46
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judicial or administrative proceeding or for a specialized government
function.53 If public health organizations, health oversight agencies, or law
enforcement officers request the information, covered entities are permitted
to disclose only the PHI that is specifically requested.54 When the patient is a
victim of neglect, abuse, or domestic violence, the PHI can also be
disclosed.55 Disclosure is also permissible for authorized research purposes
or when required for workers’ compensation claims.56 If the patient is a
decedent and the medical examiner or coroner requests limited amounts of
PHI, the covered entity may disclose this information; further, if the
decedent’s organs are donated, PHI can be disclosed if needed for the
donation process.57 Lastly, covered entities may disclose PHI if it is related
to a threat to the safety of the public.58
The most relevant and permissible disclosure for physicians dealing
with intoxicated patients is the provision about public safety. If a physician
is under the impression that a patient has the propensity to cause harm upon
leaving the E.D., disclosure is permissible to law enforcement officers who
have the capability “to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the
health or safety of a person or the public[] . . . .”59
C. HIPAA Violations
The Privacy Rule, championed by much of the public, is patientcentric––the Rule provides increased control to patients and more significant
consequences for health care providers.60 While patients and patient
advocates laud the Rule, physicians who must wrestle with its disclosures
cannot help but see it as yet another opportunity for liability.61 Both civil and
criminal penalties can occur when a covered entity violates the Privacy
Rule.62 “[F]ear of liability for violating HIPAA, coupled with [a]
misunderstanding of its provisions, can be a recipe for not sharing, even in
circumstances where such sharing is expressly permitted and arguably
important for patient care and/or public safety.”63 In essence, physicians feel
53

Id. § 164.512(a)(1).
Id. § 164.512(b), (d), (f).
Id. § 164.512(c)(ii).
56
Id. § 164.512(i).
57
Id. § 164.512 (g), (h).
58
Id. § 164.512 (a)(1), (b)(1), (c), (d) (emphasis added).
59
Id. § 164.512(j)(i)(A).
60
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 48.
61
Donna Bowers, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: Is it Really All That Bad?,
14 BAYLOR U. MED. CENTER PROC. 347, 348 (2001), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1305
898/pdf/bumc0014-0347.pdf (“Health care providers believe that the privacy rules will impede their ability
to treat patients. Health care organizations are worried about their ability to comply since the rules are quite
complicated.”).
62
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 48.
63
CDT Testifies, Says HIPAA Sharing Rules Need Clarity, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 29,
2013), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/meredith-whipple/2904cdt-testifies-says-hipaa-sharing-rules-need-clarit
y.
54
55
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they are at risk of violating HIPAA when disclosing PHI and also at risk of
violating tort law for not disclosing PHI if a third party could be injured.
Thus, the nature of the Privacy Rule creates a conflict between tort law and
the federal medical privacy law.
Since compliance with the Privacy Rule became effective in 2003,
nearly 91,000 complaints have been filed with the Office for Civil Rights.64
Of this staggering number, approximately 23,000 of the complaints were
investigated and resulted in the strict enforcement of HIPAA.65 Causing even
more concern for physicians, from 2004 to 2013, the Office for Civil Rights
primarily investigated issues of impermissible uses and disclosures of PHI.66
Though most physicians are undoubtedly seeking to remain
compliant with HIPAA, there is also an inherent desire to protect third parties.
When discussing whether to notify police about an intoxicated patient in the
E.D. who may have left the scene of an accident where he likely injured
others, one physician notes, “[h]e does not enjoy an unbreakable bonding with
me as it pertains to his irresponsibility and/or illegal activities. . . . This call
serves the greater good.”67
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Privacy Rule Causes Tension for E.D. Physicians
The Privacy Rule lacks adequate guidance for physicians dealing
with intoxicated patients and must be amended. Though the Privacy Rule
does not expressly prohibit physicians from disclosing information to law
enforcement about intoxicated patients who have left the E.D. and may cause
harm, it also lacks sufficient direction about what is permissible to disclose in
this type of situation. While it may be easier to defend a breach of PHI than
it is to defend a vehicular homicide or personal injury case, more guidance
about the scope of the Privacy Rule will be beneficial to physicians. It is clear
that the Privacy Rule does not dictate a mandatory duty for physicians to warn
of intoxicated patients;68 instead, the Privacy Rule merely states that
physicians will not be in violation of HIPAA by releasing information falling

64
Health Information Privacy Complaints Received by Calendar Year, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/data/complaintsyear.html (last
visited at Mar. 23, 2015).
65
Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.hhs.
gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/index.html.
66
Top Five Issues in Investigated Cases Closed with Corrective Action, by Calendar Year, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/data/top5issues.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
67
Cotton et al., supra note 5, at 236.
68
When Does the Privacy Rule Allow Covered Entities to Disclose Protected Health Information to
Law Enforcement Officials?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (JULY 23, 2004), http://www.hhs.g
ov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/disclosures_for_law_enforcement_purposes/505.html.
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under the itemized circumstance.69
Prior to implementation of the Rule, the common law in Ohio offered
limited guidance to physicians in situations of extended liability.70 In Biddle
v. Warren General Hospital, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld an independent
tort applying to physicians who make unauthorized disclosures of personal
medical information.71 At the same time, the court ruled that physicians have
specific common law duties to disclose information that has an effect on third
party safety.72 In fact, “the breach of [these duties] can result in civil
liability.”73 The court held that even in cases without a specific legal
obligation, physicians might be privileged to disclose information when it
could provide safety for individual third parties.74
As far back as 1928, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a
physician’s common law duty is to protect third parties from dangerous
patients––this principle stems from a need in the 1920s to disclose the identity
of those suffering from small pox.75 This same principle also permeates
advisory associations, such as the American Medical Association, which has
permitted physicians since 1957 to breach medical confidence in situations
where it is deemed necessary to protect third party individuals and the
community at large.76
Upon implementation of the Privacy Rule, physicians face the task of
determining what information can be disclosed under their state’s common
law and what information can be disclosed under the provisions in HIPAA.77
Upon initial analysis of the Privacy Rule, it is clear that physicians were
stymied by the ambiguity in the provision. As one law firm writes, “[w]e
have counseled numerous clients about the use [of the Privacy Rule exception
for preventing harm] in the face of actual fact scenarios over the years.”78
Ultimately, the vagueness of the Privacy Rule and how it applies to
intoxicated patients causes anxiety for emergency physicians.
First and foremost, physicians feel called to protect people.79 The
code of ethics for emergency medicine physicians states that these doctors
69

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2013).
See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 524 (Ohio 1999).
71
Id. at 528.
72
Id. at 524.
73
Id. (citation omitted).
74
Id.
75
Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 458 (Ohio 1928) (discussing how an Ohio physician has a duty to
disclose a patient’s contagious disease to protect third parties).
76
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1326 (Ohio 1997).
77
How do Other Privacy Protections Interact with the Privacy Rule?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_05.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
78
Julie A. Knutson, HIPAA Threat of Harm Exception Gets a Second Look, BAIRD HOLM LLP (Sept.
2, 2013), http://www.bairdholm.com/publications-feed/entry/hipaa-threat-of-harm-exception-gets-a-seco
nd-look.html.
79
Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians (2009), ILL. INST. OF TECH. (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:15 PM),
http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/4892.
70
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should “[e]mbrace patient welfare as their primary professional
responsibility.”80 This desire to protect others initially begins with the
specific patient, but also flows to nurses, aides, individual third parties such
as patients’ families, and the public at large.81 The vague language of the
exception for harm does a disservice to physicians who are not clear about
what their rights are under HIPAA. When a frantic E.D. physician realizes
an intoxicated patient has left prior to being legally sober, society should not
ask this physician to then grapple with nuances of the vague Privacy Rule.82
Based on the ethical requirements of the emergency medicine profession, the
primary goal is patient care, and to expect any type of legal analysis while in
the middle of patient care is both unrealistic and inappropriate.83
Specifically, the physician would likely feel inclined to determine
whether the situation with the intoxicated patient reached the requisite level
for disclosure, given that intoxication screens may be used for legal
purposes.84 An intoxication screen “is often done in emergency medical
situations[] . . . to evaluate possible accidental or intentional overdose or
poisoning. It may help determine the cause of acute drug toxicity[] . . . and to
determine the presence of substances in the body for medical or legal
purposes.”85 The physician, relying on the skills learned in medical school
and throughout her medical training, will also feel the pull to use
“supplemental information (including . . . performance on psychophysical
tests, values obtained in physiological assessments, and unusual behaviors,
statements or observations)” in making the decision of the patient’s level of
intoxication.86 The decision to make a disclosure about an intoxicated
patient’s potential harm to others is more difficult to make without actually
being able to assess the patient and hospitals encourage patients to resist the
urge to leave the E.D. prior to seeing the physician.87
Second, the provision’s vagueness enhances the fear most physicians
have of incurring a HIPAA violation and the damage it will cause to their
personal reputations, their employment statuses, and the reputation of their
80

Id.
Id. (“The emergency physician owes duties not only to his or her patients, but also to the society in
which the physician and patients dwell.”).
82
Rob Stein, Patient Privacy Rules Bring Wide Confusion; New Directives Often Misunderstood, THE
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/08/18/patient-priv
acy-rules-bring-wide-confusion/ba0d516a-7477-41dc-9d7b-6343967bf4c3/ (“But frequent misunderstandings about what the rules allow have been causing frustration, uncertainty and anxiety in doctors’
offices, clinics, hospitals and even pharmacies across the country.”).
83
ILL. INST. OF TECH., supra note 79.
84
Toxicology Screen, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/test/toxicol
ogy-screen/overview.html (describing how the toxicology test may be administered “to determine the
presence of substances in the body for medical or legal purposes.”).
85
Id.
86
Sarah Kerrigan, Drug Toxicology for Prosecutors: Targeting Hardcore Impaired Drivers, AM.
PROSECUTORS RES. INST. 1, 8 (2004), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/drug_toxicology_for_prosecutors_04.pdf.
87
See, e.g., Emergency Department, HARDIN MEM’L HEALTH, http://www.hmh.net/hmhwebsite/Serv
ice.aspx?PageID=16 (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
81
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hospitals.88 Though there are specific types of insurance companies working
with health care providers who have allegedly violated HIPAA, these are an
additional expense for physicians.89 Professional liability insurance may also
already insure physicians in the event of such a violation.90 Certain physicians
who are particularly anxious about incurring penalties may desire this double
protection, however.
In the current litigious society, medical professionals have a
heightened desire to protect themselves from any form of professional or
personal penalties.91 In both recognition of this desire and as an effort to
clarify the nature of the Privacy Rule, the Office for Civil Rights at Health
and Human Services sent a letter in January of 2013 to explain when it is
appropriate to contact authorities when dealing with dangerous patients.92
While the letter was undoubtedly written to provide professional clarity to
physicians, its focus on mental health leaves much to be desired about proper
disclosures for intoxication.93
Third, physicians also fear that not notifying authorities increases the
likelihood of future damage or injury, such as extended liability.94 Based on
medical malpractice standards, most physicians are exceedingly pro-active in
preventing any sort of harm that could befall a patient.95 Successful medical
malpractice lawsuits require a duty of care to patients, a breach of this duty
that results in an injury, and proof that the breach of care caused harm.96
Though preventing medical malpractice is ingrained in physicians since
medical school, avoiding liability can seem out of balance with permitted
disclosure under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, at least to an untrained eye.97 Even
though medical schools do make an effort to teach the basics of legal issues
they will face in practice, “the discussion focuses on malpractice as opposed
to regulatory and enforcement issues.”98

88
David G. Jensen, Complaints of HIPAA Violations: Enforcement, CAL. ASS’N OF MARRIAGE &
FAMILY THERAPISTS, http://www.camft.org/ScriptContent/HIPAA/Complaints.htm (last updated Aug.
2010).
89
David Lenckus, HIPAA Violations Covered Under Liability Policies, BUS. INS. (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20041114/ISSUE01/100015717.
90
Id.
91
Rob Lamberts, Dear HIPAA: It’s Time to Decide Who You Want to Be, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/03/26/dear-hipaa-its-time/.
92
Rodriguez, supra note 10.
93
See generally id.
94
News Release, Poll of Emergency Physicians Show More Than Half Order Tests as Protection
Against Being Sued, American College of Emergency Physicians (May 23, 2011).
95
Id.
96
Carolyn Buppert, What is My Legal Obligation if I Allow an Intoxicated Patient to Drive Home?,
MEDSCAPE (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/578133.
97
Nirav D. Shah, The Teaching of Law in Medical Education, 10 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 332, 332
(2008), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2008/05/oped1-0805.html.
98
Id. at 333.
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B. Privacy Rule Appears More Attuned to Mentally Ill
Though the HIPAA provision that permits disclosure to prevent an
imminent threat technically would apply to intoxicated patients, it is worded
to allow physicians to assume it mainly applies to dangerous mentally ill
patients. The provision is phrased in a way that nearly quotes the seminal
mental health disclosure case, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
as well as § 41 Restatement (Third) of Torts.99 In a society focused on the
plight of mental health workers and therapists who oftentimes treat dangerous
patients, most physicians would be likely to interpret the provision as
applying exclusively to the mentally ill.100 In fact, “[t]he rule’s approach is
consistent with the ‘duty to warn’ third persons at risk, which has been
established through case law.”101
Physicians are most likely to equate a duty to warn third parties of
dangerous patients with the scenario from the pivotal Tarasoff case. Prosenjit
Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff in 1969 after telling his psychologist of his
intent to kill the young woman.102 Tarasoff’s parents sued the psychologist’s
employer, the University of California at Berkeley, alleging that the
psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, had urged campus police to detain Poddar
after making his threat against Tarasoff but that the police released him
shortly thereafter.103 The crux of the lawsuit was whether or not Dr. Moore,
his superior, or the campus police had a duty to warn Tarasoff or her parents
of Poddar’s threat.104
In holding that mental health practitioners have a duty to warn third
parties of threats, Judge Tobin stated, “the public policy favoring protection
of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.”105
Tarasoff, decided in 1976 by the California Supreme Court, has since
expanded into a majority of jurisdictions that now also hold that a mental
therapist has a duty to use reasonable care in protecting any and all foreseeable
victims of a patient who has made a credible threat of harm.106
Just over twenty years after Tarasoff was decided, Ohio implemented
its own mandatory duty to warn of explicit threats made by mentally ill
99
W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty to Warn Third Parties,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 877 (2009).
100
Id. at 883.
101
Uses and Disclosures for Which an Authorization or Opportunity to Agree or Object is Not
Required: Uses and Disclosures to Avert a Serious Threat to Health or Safety – § 164.512(j), BRICKER &
ECKLER, http://bricker.com/resource-center/hipaa/key-resources/resource/hipaa-privacy-regulations-usesand-disclosures-for-which-an-authorization-or-opportunity-to-agree-or-object-is-not-required-seriousthreats-to-health-or-safety-§-164512j-363 (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
102
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339 (Cal. 1976).
103
Id.at 339–40.
104
Id. at 341.
105
Id. at 347.
106
Cardi, supra note 99, at 877.
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individuals.107 This duty to warn covers circumstances where a mental health
professional has reason to believe that his patient has the intent to cause harm
to a third party as well as the capability to carry out the threat.108 Following
the same line of reasoning as the proposed expansion to the Privacy Rule, it
is ideal for duty to warn legislation to apply to intoxicated individuals who
have the intent and capability to access a car and drive away from the E.D.
While the Ohio law is far from perfect––lacking in the same areas as the
Privacy Rule––it succeeds in giving explicit guidance to mental health
professionals as to any potential liability after disclosure.109 Whereas the
Privacy Rule skirts around the issue of liability, the Ohio law states that:
The mental health professional or organization is not liable
in damages in a civil action, and shall not be made subject to
disciplinary action by any entity with licensing or other
regulatory authority over the professional or organization, for
disclosing any confidential information about a mental health
client or patient that is disclosed for the purpose of taking any
of the actions.110
This provision explicitly dictates to mental health providers that they will
suffer no adverse legal and disciplinary action for disclosing relevant threats
of harm.111 An amendment to the HIPAA Privacy Rule should do the same.
In addition to Tarasoff and other states’ laws, § 41 Restatement
(Third) of Torts also dictates a duty for mental health providers to warn a
patient’s potential victims.112 While the Restatement is quite clear as to the
duty for mental health providers, it is notably silent as to its applicability for
health care providers other than those treating the mentally ill.113
Commentary indicates that the lack of language specifying the same duty to
non-mental health-providers could be because a large number of jurisdictions
have not yet even addressed this very question––it is a relatively unexplored
phenomenon.114 The time to address this phenomenon is now, before an
onslaught of scenarios that could occur at any given time.
Though provisions allocating specific care to be taken in relation to
dangerous mental health patients is entirely valid and crucial for a safer
society, this same impulse to protect should be directly paralleled to the
context of intoxicated individuals.115 Though threats made by the mentally ill
107

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.51(B) (LexisNexis 1999).
Id. § 2305.51(B).
109
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.51(C)(4) (LexisNexis 1999).
110
Id. § 2305.51(C)(4).
111
Id. § 2305.51(C)(4).
112
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 41(b)(4) (2005).
113
Cardi, supra note 99, at 877.
114
Id. at 881.
115
Patricia C. Kussmann, Civil Liability of Psychiatrist Arising out of Patient’s Violent Conduct
Resulting in Injury to or Death of Patient or Third Party Allegedly Caused in Whole or Part by Mental
108
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may be of a more direct nature than a more generalized threat of harm, the
harm itself is still preventable.116 Further, the nameless people who would be
harmed by an intoxicated driver have no less reason to be protected than the
named possible victims of a mentally ill patient. Yet despite the parallel to
the mentally ill, HIPAA does not require this life-changing disclosure but
instead merely permits it.117
C. Amending the Privacy Rule
It is essential to amend the Privacy Rule to create an unequivocal duty
to warn authorities when intoxicated patients who have left the E.D. because
they have the capability and possibly the intent to cause harm. Emergency
physicians work in a tense, fast-paced environment and are not all aware of
Privacy Rule’s true requirements and allowances.118 It is not timely to contact
the legal department in the middle of a shift.119 As such, the amendment
should eliminate the guesswork for providers to determine what is permissible
and what would constitute a HIPAA violation.
Currently, the relevant portion of the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R.
164.512(j)(1)(i), states:
(1) A covered entity may, consistent with applicable law and
standards of ethical conduct, use or disclose protected health
information, if the covered entity, in good faith, believes the
use or disclosure:
(i)(A) Is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and
imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the
public; and
(B) Is to a person or persons reasonably able to prevent or
lessen the threat, including the target of the threat[] . . . .120
While the provision may be quite clear to legal scholars, the phrases used are
more ambiguous to health care professionals who are not as familiar with the
nuances of legal analysis. When legislation is written for a specific niche of
people––in this scenario, physicians––drafters should remember that laymen
Disorder, 80 A.L.R.6th 469 § 28 ((explaining that some courts find that mental health professionals have
a duty to protect against foreseeable harm, even if there was not an explicit threat to the third party).
116
The Highway Safety Desk Book, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://ntl.bts.gov/DOC
S/deskbk.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“Patrolling our streets and highways remains the vital task of
protecting public safety, through the proven deterrence of aggressive, intelligent traffic law enforcement.”).
117
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 68.
118
Bonnie Darves, From Minor Annoyances to Treatment Delays, Physicians Feeling Fallout of
HIPAA Privacy Law, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS (Sept. 2003), http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2003/
09/privacy.htm.
119
See, e.g., Tyson, supra note 3 (detailing an average shift of an emergency physician); Darves, supra
note 118 (“[M]ost physicians do not have time to pick up the phone and do some HIPAA education every
time they encounter a problem.”).
120
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i) (2013).
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are likely to interpret words according to their ordinary meaning, not
according to their specialized legal contexts. Specifically, the terms “good
faith,” “imminent threat,” “reasonably able,” and “target” in the Privacy Rule
are unclear for physicians who must make decisions in the middle of medical
emergencies.
“Good faith” is a widely recognized legal term, but is one that causes
more confusion for non-legal professionals than it provides answers.121 The
legal community has varying opinions of what “good faith” means, depending
on the context and the specialty of law of which it is related.122 In adding yet
another interpretation of “good faith,” and arguably the only one that matters
for the topic at hand, this provision of the Privacy Rule requires either the
provider’s actual knowledge or a statement of apparent knowledge by
someone other than the provider.123 A physician might be unsure about
whether she can notify law enforcement in “good faith” solely based on
concerns over the patient’s behavior and mannerisms, or only if the patient’s
blood alcohol content is above the legal threshold.124
This matter is further complicated by the so-called “left without being
seen” occurrence, which is marked by a patient leaving the E.D. prior to any
test or treatment.125 In fact, “‘[t]he number of [left without being seen] visits
has increased dramatically in the past 15 years,’ says Renee Y. Hsia, MD,
MSc.”126 Thus, it can be implied that some intoxicated individuals, or those
who are suspected of being intoxicated, leave the E.D. prior to receiving a
toxicology screen. Physicians with non-confirmed suspicions about the blood
alcohol content of a patient may feel strongly about notifying law
enforcement but are unsure if the lack of actual proof meets the “good faith”
requirement of the law.127 This situation is also compounded by the fact that
not all individuals who are over the legal limit portray obvious physical signs;
a patient with a blood alcohol level of 0.09, which constitutes illegal
intoxication, may exude only minimal signs of impairment.128
121
Towards an Implied Duty of Good Faith Under English Law, JONES DAY (May 2013), http://www.j
onesday.com/Towards-an-Implied-Duty-of-Good-Faith-Under-English-Law/.
122
Duty of Good Faith, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/duty_of_good_faith (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015); Mayra C. Artiles Fonseca, Negotiating in Good Faith: Only a Civil Law
Obligation?, PANGEA UPR (Oct. 12, 2013), http://pangeaupr.org/2013/12/10/negotiating-in-good-faith/.
123
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(4) (“A covered entity that uses or discloses protected health information . .
. is presumed to have acted in good faith . . . if the belief is based upon the covered entity’s actual knowledge
or in reliance on a credible representation by a person with apparent knowledge or authority.”).
124
VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-269(A)(3) (West 2012) (stating that a presumption for alcohol intoxication
exists when there is at least 0.08 percent of alcohol in an individual’s blood); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-1015.5(b)(1) (discussing how the laws of Indiana consider one form of actual knowledge to be the intoxicated
individual’s condition and behavior when leaving the establishment).
125
Renee Y. Hsia, A New Look at Leaving Without Being Seen in EDs, PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (Mar.
27, 2012), http://www.physiciansweekly.com/a-new-look-at-leaving-without-being-seen-in-eds/.
126
Id.
127
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(4) (2013).
128
Alcohol Intoxication, Acute, MD GUIDELINES, http://www.mdguidelines.com/alcohol-intoxicationacute (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
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The use of the word “threat” can also cause hesitation. In the context
of HIPAA, “threat” is assumed to be focused on specific threats of violence
as opposed to generalized risk of harm from intoxicated driving.129 Thus,
many physicians might be perplexed in rendering whether an intoxicated
patient’s possibility of causing a car accident is the same as when an
individual who makes an unequivocal threat to leave the hospital and harm
someone.130 It is well established that such a specific threat of violence by a
patient is certainly applicable to this provision of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.131
That being said, there are other threats of more generalized harm, such as
intoxicated patients behind the wheel of a vehicle, which should not be
overlooked.132
Aiding in the oft-limited interpretation of “threat” is the media’s
focus on mental health in relation to this provision of the Privacy Rule.133 The
application of this provision in the media is mostly seen in connection to mass
shootings and other similar tragedies, such as the shootings at Virginia Tech,
Newtown, Connecticut, and Aurora, Colorado.134 Considering the amount of
media coverage on the permissibility of disclosing mentally ill patients who
subsequently become shooters, it is not surprising that physicians equate a
“threat of imminent harm” with that context only.135
Adding yet another layer of perplexity is the phrase “reasonably
able.” It is clear that a disclosure about a specific, threatened incident could
be made to a law enforcement officer.136 In a scenario involving a patient who
has threatened to poison a family member, the physician could disclose to law
enforcement as much information about the patient and the threat as is needed
for the police to be able to protect all relevant parties.137 This clear example
is far more muddled in relation to an intoxicated patient who is missing from
the E.D. A physician may not be aware if the patient drove himself to the
129
See, e.g., Peter MacKoul, Understanding of HIPAA Privacy Rule May Have Avoided Virginia Tech
Tragedy, HIPAA SOLUTIONS (2007), http://www.hipaasolutions.org/documents/HIPAAatViginiaTech.p
df.
130
Ericka L. Adler, HIPAA Does Not Prevent Information Disclosure if Patient Poses Harm,
PHYSICIANS PRACTICE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/hipaa-does-not-preventinformation-disclosure-if-patient-poses-harm (discussing the difficulty physicians encounter when
determining if they can disclose information about a patient who poses a danger to others).
131
Kussmann, supra note 115, at § 28.
132
Drinking and Driving: A Threat to Everyone, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/features/vitalsigns/drinkinganddriving/ (last updated Oct. 15, 2013) (stating that
intoxicated drivers are a threat to other individuals on the road).
133
MacKoul, supra note 129.
134
Id.; Rodriguez, supra note 10.
135
Adler, supra note 130 (“With recent incidents like the ones in Newtown, Conn., and Aurora, Colo.,
providers across the country are questioning what should be done if they believe a patient poses a threat to
others.”).
136
Where the HIPAA Privacy Rule Applies, Does it Permit a Health Care Provider to Disclose
Protected Health Information (PHI) About a Patient to Law Enforcement, Family Members, or Others if
the Provider Believes the Patient Presents a Serious Danger to Self or Others?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (NOV. 25, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/ferpa_and_hipaa/520.html.
137
Hospital and Law Enforcement Guide to Disclosure of Protected Health Information, WASH. STATE
HOSP. ASS’N 1, 9 (Aug. 2010), https://depts.washington.edu/comply/docs/HLE_Guide.pdf.
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hospital, stumbled into the E.D. on foot, or was a passenger of someone else.
Not knowing this critical piece of information could stymie a physician who
wonders if the disclosure is even necessary because the patient could be safely
strapped into the passenger seat of another’s vehicle.138
Even if the patient did indeed drive himself, the physician is entirely
unlikely to have information from the medical intake forms about the patient’s
vehicle description or license plate.139 Other than the home address of the
patient, a standard medical form as used in the E.D. will provide no additional
information to any law enforcement officer in order for them to be considered
“reasonably able” to lessen the harm.140 Thus, a physician is perfectly
validated in hesitating over this type of disclosure when the PHI is limited. If
an intoxicated patient specifically states to the physician his intention to drive
on a given road immediately after leaving the E.D., and this patient, for any
reason, leaves the E.D. prior to reaching sobriety, the physician has far more
indication that an officer could patrol this road to prevent possible harm to
other drivers.141 Only in a perfect world, however, is a physician likely to be
provided with such clear-cut information from an intoxicated patient.
The last of the potentially unclear terms in the provision is “target.”
This portion of the provision seems to be more of a linguistic side note, as
denoted by the language: “including the target of the threat[]. . . .”142 Though
this phrase is related to the physician’s ability to contact the person named as
the potential victim, it is apt to mystify a physician in the midst of the hectic
E.D. setting. In situations with intoxicated drivers, the possible target would
likely refer to those on the roadways as opposed to a specific person.
Determining the target of a patient’s threat is no easy task:
There is a distinction between a patient saying, “I am going
to kill my wife” (disclosure permitted for her protection) and
a general statement, “I’m so angry I could kill someone.”
Doctors weighing these potential “threats” do so at great
peril. In one instance failure to warn may lead to civil liability
to the victim; while issuing a warning in too general a threat
may lead to legal action by the patient for invading the
privilege.143

138
Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 995 N.E.2d. 148, 151 (N.Y. 2013) (stating that the
emergency physician did not have a duty to contact law enforcement when an intoxicated patient left the
E.D. because the physician had no specific facts that would help in the search for the patient).
139
Medical Forms, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/medicalforms/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2016).
140
Id.
141
Rodriguez, supra note 10 (discussing that a provider can disclose information to individuals, such
as law enforcement officers, who can reasonably lessen the potential harm).
142
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(B) (2013) (emphasis added).
143
Rich Meehan, The Limits of Confidentiality, CONN. MEDIA GRP. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://blog.ctnews.com/meehan/2012/08/03/the-limits-of-confidentiality/.
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Given the intricate balance between sharing a general target of harm, such as
those on the road between the E.D. and the patient’s next destination, and
sharing only the name of a specific victim, it is understandable that a
physician would wonder if it lines up with the setting she may be dealing with
in her E.D.
Taking the aforementioned considerations into account, the Privacy
Rule should be amended. The new provision should state:
A covered entity
(1) must, consistent with applicable law and standards of
ethical conduct, inform local or state law enforcement
officers, and
(2) is permitted to use or disclose protected health
information,
when the covered entity reasonably believes a patient is
legally intoxicated, and believes the use or disclosure is
necessary to prevent the intoxicated patient from
(a) operating a motor vehicle, or
(b) causing any harm to the health or safety of a person
or the public.
The use and disclosure may also be made to hospital security
to lessen or prevent potential harm while on hospital grounds.
Upon implementing the changes to the Privacy Rule’s provision allowing
disclosures to be made about intoxicated patients, the likely result will be less
confusion for physicians and safer roadways for the public. In addition, the
safety of the patient himself must be considered, and this provision will
protect not just innocent third parties but will also promote the wellbeing of
the patient.
Beyond an amendment to the Privacy Rule, the next best way to
provide clear guidance for physicians working in the E.D is for all hospitals
to create, publish, and distribute hospital policies relating to intoxicated
patients.144 As one health care attorney explains, having a written policy as to
how the hospital or physician practice will handle intoxicated individuals is
critical––distributing the policy to staff members and discussing the policy
can help eliminate staff members’ confusion.145 The attorney also advises
physician to discuss the matter in a non-confrontational way by
“approach[ing] the patient about being intoxicated. Express concern about the
144

Patel & Garmel, supra note 35, at 106.
Michael J. Schoppmann, Intoxicated Patients, FAMILY PRACTICE MGMT. (July-Aug. 1999),
http://www.aafp.org/fpm/1999/0700/p50.html.
145
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patient's ability to drive, and offer to help the patient find an alternate ride
home. Some practices even pay the patient's cab fare out of a special pettycash
fund.”146
In order to protect the hospital and physicians from liability that may
result after an intoxicated patient leaves the E.D., appropriate documentation
of the patient’s visit is critical.147 When the patient is inebriated, “[a] detailed
description of the patient’s mental status and overall appearance, including
inappropriate actions the patient has taken, should be included in the chart.”148
While an amendment to HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is the most effective way to
legally protect physicians as well as promote the wellbeing of the public,
hospitals should take extra care to make sure physicians are aware of their
rights in treating intoxicated patients.149
IV. CONCLUSION
The influx of intoxicated patients in the emergency departments
across America is a problem. When these intoxicated patients leave the E.D.
prior to reaching a legal level of sobriety and thus raise the possibility of
endangering the public, emergency physicians must venture into the
murkiness of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Instead of providing illustrative
guidance to emergency physicians, the Privacy Rule’s vague provision about
disclosing information to protect the public is confusing at best and
misleading at worst. The Privacy Rule must be amended to explicitly permit
physicians to make disclosures that could protect the public from harm.
Innocent third parties deserve to be protected from all types of danger, but
this protection cannot be ensured until physicians are given clear guidance.
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